It's been a long time since looking back here. I've been curious at re-examining some text-based screening criteria that I was using before Prosper entered the legal limbo, but, alas, Texas is still stata-non-grata. Until then, I'll watch from the sidelines.
Cheers - Mike
I started a new job a while back. A very good move for me and my family, but horrible for my free time and my free brainpower. I tried to deny it, but the reality is that I've got nothing left. I could pretend otherwise, but that's self-delusion. I still believe in Prosper and will keep lending, but Prosperous Land is going DOA for a while.
If things settle down, I may return.
With the IRS blasting an estimated $105 billion dollars toward the public, the great question is where that check will go. I'm skeptical that it'll provide the economic stimulus that folks in government were expecting - I've always assumed that folks will use it to pay off credit card bills or buy their next tank of gas, neither of which stimulates the US economy. But paying off bills will get some Prosper loans paid down. The Orlando Business Journal is estimating that $28 billion of the $105 billion (26.6%) will go toward debt repayment, implying that a lot of money will flow into Prosper loan repayment.
I'll be watching for increased prepayments and, hopefully, some recovery from those doggy late loans while the checks roll out between now and the end of July.
Prosper's April Marketplace survey was an interesting read. Mostly for the disclaimers at the bottom. Prosper's definition of "Attractive Risk-Return Tradeoff" was insightful.
Attractive Risk-Return Tradeoff: For purposes of this survey release, listings are considered to have attractive returns if, based on historical loan repayment performance of Prosper borrowers with similar characteristics, they are priced sufficiently to compensate lenders for risk. Risk includes both the risk of non-payment by the borrower and other risks associated with people-to-people lending. In general, as the credit quality of the borrower declines, the range of possible returns widens, requiring a larger risk premium to compensate the additional uncertainty. The amount of risk premium required to compensate for a given level of risk is a subjective judgment. The following formula is used by Prosper to determine if a listing is priced adequately to have an attractive risk adjusted return: Maximum Borrower Rate > Risk Free Rate1 + 3.25% + (Expected Annual Default * 1.5) + Prosper Servicing Fee. All lenders should make there own judgments with respect to what constitutes an adequately priced listing.
1 Risk Free Rate = 2-year CD national rate on BankRate.
In April, we saw the supply of loan listings with an attractive risk-return tradeoff hit an all time high and approximately double compared to the prior month. At the end of March, the supply of loan listings with an attractive risk-return tradeoff was approximately $5 million; and at the end of April the supply increased to approximately $11 million and has remained at that level into May.This significant increase in the supply of loan listings with an attractive risk-return tradeoff is attributed to the fact that on April 15 we commenced our business arrangement with WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank. Through our agreement, all loans originated through the Prosper marketplace resulting from listings posted on or after April 15, 2008 are made by WebBank under its bank charter. Prosper provides services to WebBank in connection with the origination of such loans and Prosper services loans made to Prosper borrowers on behalf of registered Prosper lenders who purchase such loans. In effect, this partnership opened the platform to more borrowers, who may have previously been constrained by low state rate caps.
Also in April, we saw the supply of prime borrower listings hit an all time high, accounting for nearly half of all loan listings in terms of dollars requested. Prime borrower originations also reached its record level of 43% of funded loans.
Currently, the significant increased supply of quality listings is providing more attractive bidding opportunities, which is making it easier for lenders to efficiently deploy more money onto the platform.
Prosper did a feature drop the night of the 18th, and Andrew posted about it on the Prosper blog. This was an infrastructure drop, with improvements to the backend, but nothing visible right now:
As of this release, we’re automating more of our bankruptcy tracking to set the stage for us to be able to start giving lenders the bankruptcy chapter number and filing date in the future.
Prosper sent out a monthly newsletter that hit my email box today. The most astounding thing has been the rather notable fall in the portfolio ROI.
I had a hard time believing that the conservative portfolio estimated return had dropped to 5.10%. I remember the heady days of 8% anticipated returns with the Conservative portfolio. With Bankrate showing some 3-year CDs offering 4.45%, what exactly is the attraction? I cannot see the added risk of the Prosper lending market being worth about a half a percent, especially when the principle is not guaranteed and there's no way to get the money out (yet) if you need it.
Only Prosper could pinpoint what's driving this, but several rate cuts and banks desperately competing for high quality borrowers probably isn't helping.
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